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0R¶ esum¶ e:
Ce papier ¶ etudie le processus co^ uteux en temps d'appariement des deux c^ ot¶ es du march¶ e, chacun
ayant des caract¶ eristiques diverses. Ceci est plac¶ e dans un march¶ e du travail oµ u les travailleurs
ont des quali¯cations qui doivent ^ etre appari¶ ees avec di®¶ erents qualit¶ es de machine pour la pro-
duction. Je caract¶ erise l'allocation e±cace puis montre qu'elle peut ^ etre d¶ ecentralis¶ ee dans un
cadre concurrentiel. Un trait saillant de l'assignation frictionnelle est que chaque niveau de
quali¯cation est associ¶ e µ a un degr¶ e d'¶ etroitesse du march¶ e en plus d'une qualit¶ e de machine.
L'¶ etroitesse du march¶ e di®¶ erenci¶ ee en tant qu'instrument suppl¶ ementaire d'allocation implique
que l'assignation n'est pas toujours positivement assortative, par exemple que des machines de
haute qualit¶ e ne sont pas n¶ ecessairement assign¶ ees µ a des travailleurs hautement quali¯¶ es malgr¶ e
que qualit¶ e et quali¯cation soient compl¶ ementaires dans la production. Le m¶ ecanisme de march¶ e
qui d¶ ecentralise l'assignation e±cace a la particularit¶ e que la ¯rme a±che des salaires qui attirent
des travailleurs en plus de choisir les qualit¶ es de machine. Un ¶ etat stationnaire est ¶ etabli et des
exercices num¶ eriques sont utilis¶ es pour montrer que le di®¶ erentiel d'¶ etroitesse du march¶ e pour les
di®¶ erentes quali¯cations est ¶ egalement quantitativement important pour la fonction de salaire et
la distribution des salaires.
Abstract:
This paper examines the time-consuming process of matching the two sides of a market each
having diverse characteristics. This is cast in a labor market setting where workers of di®erent
skills need be matched with di®erent machine qualities to produce output. I characterize the
e±cient allocation and then show that it can be decentralized by a competitive framework. A
prominent feature of the frictional assignment is that each skill level is associated with a market
tightness in addition to a machine quality. The di®erential market tightness as an additional
allocative device implies that the assignment is not always positively assortative, i.e., high quality
machines are not necessarily assigned to high skills even though machine qualities and skills are
complementary in production. The market mechanism that decentralizes the e±cient assignment
has the feature that ¯rms post wages to attract workers in addition to choosing machine qualities.
A steady state is established and numerical exercises are used to show that the di®erential market
tightness for di®erent skills is also quantitatively important for the wage function and wage
distribution.
JEL classi¯cation: D33, J31, L11.
Keywords: Frictional matching; Market tightness; Skills; Machines; Wage distribution.
11 Introduction
This paper deals with the fundamental issue of resource allocation in a frictional economy, the
frictional assignment, which refers to the following two-sided matching problem. The two sides
of a market, each side having diverse characteristics, need be matched with each other in order
to produce \output". The matching process is time-consuming and the level of output depends
on the pair's characteristics. The market can be the labor market where workers of di®erent
skills need be matched with machines of di®erent qualities, or the loan market where projects of
di®erent qualities need be ¯nanced by di®erent loan provisions, or the marriage market where men
and women with di®erent attributes seek for marriages. What does the e±cient assignment look
like in this frictional world? How can a competitive market decentralize the e±cient allocation?
And, What division of the match surplus does the frictional assignment imply? These are the
questions addressed here. To be speci¯c, I will focus on the matching problem in the labor market
between machine qualities and worker skills.
The emphasis on frictions can be easily motivated by the existence of persistent unemployment
and under-utilized machines. Until recently such frictions have been ignored in the assignment
literature. The classic pieces by Tinbergen (1951) and Becker (1973) deal exclusively with fric-
tionless matching environments, i.e., economies where a match can be formed instantaneously
if it is advantageous for the two sides to do so.1 A central result there, that the market yields
e±cient assignments, fails in general in the frictional environment with random-matching even
when agents on each side of the market are homogeneous (see Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982),
Pissarides (1990) and Hosios (1990)). This failure makes one wonder whether agents can design
other mechanisms to capture the large unrealized gains in the frictional matching environment.
Besides e±ciency, there are other issues that motivate the examination of a frictional assign-
ment. The ¯rst is about the nature of the assignment and the second is about wage inequality
between skilled and unskilled workers. In a frictionless matching world, the market assignment is
1See Sattinger (1993) for a survey and Jovanovic (1998) for a dynamic model.
2positive in the sense that high machine qualities are allocated to high skills, provided that the two
sides are complementary in the production function. The positive assignment implies that the
wage di®erential between a high-skill worker and a low-skill worker is attributed to the di®erence
in machine qualities assigned to them as well as to the skill di®erence itself. With frictions it is
far from obvious whether the assignment is positive and so, to understand wage inequality, one
must know what the frictional assignment looks like.
To address these issues I examine a large market where workers di®er in skills and skills are
complementary with machine qualities in production. To emphasize the di®erence between a
frictional assignment and a frictionless one, skills are assumed to be perfectly observable so as to
make it straightforward to characterize the frictionless assignment. There is free entry by ¯rms
which choose machine qualities to match with workers. The matching process is time-consuming,
as each worker can choose at most one ¯rm in a period to form a match. I characterize the e±cient
allocation, show that it can be decentralized by a competitive framework, and then explore the
implications on wage inequality.
The main departure of the e±cient frictional assignment from a frictionless one is that it is
not always positive, even though machine qualities and worker skills are always complementary
in production. This is because a frictional assignment must assign a \right" number of ¯rms (i.e.,
tightness) as well as a \right" machine quality to each skill in order to ensure e±ciency and, as
a result, high-skill workers might be compensated by su±ciently less tight markets that make
it unnecessary to assign to them high quality machines at the same time. To ensure a positive
assignment, machine qualities and skills must be su±ciently complementary in production.
There is a realistic market mechanism that decentralizes the e±cient assignment. The key
feature of the decentralization is that ¯rms post wages to a®ect the number of matches they get.
The philosophical reason for this mechanism to be e±cient is that ¯rms, the side of the market
that incurs the cost of making a match (the cost of vacancy), are given the \property rights" to
post wages to divide the match surplus. This generates di®erential market tightness for di®erent
3skills that rewards the ¯rm's choice of machine qualities and so implements the e±cient outcome.
In contrast, the lack of such property rights, as characterized by an exogenous matching function
and an exogenous division of the match surplus, contributes to the failure of the markets in
delivering e±ciency in the random matching model mentioned above.2
The di®erential market tightness for di®erent skills is also quantitatively signi¯cant for the
wage di®erential between skills. Calibration exercises show that the friction increases wage in-
equality more through the di®erential market tightness than through changes in the machine
quality assignment. A general technological progress that increases all skills' productivity in the
same proportion bene¯ts low-skill workers more than high-skill workers.
This paper builds on wage-posting models analyzed previously by Peters (1991), Montgomery
(1991), Burdett et al. (1996), Moen (1997) and Acemoglu and Shimer (1998). In particular, Moen
(1997) shows that the e±cient allocation in a frictional matching economy can be decentralized
by a wage-posting framework. The main limitation of these previous wage-posting models is that
one or two sides of the markets are assumed to be homogeneous. This makes the assignment
problem much less interesting, since the gist of the assignment problem is to ¯nd how di®erences
in one factor price can be ampli¯ed by di®erences in other factors assigned to it. Allowing
both machines and workers to have di®erent qualities is necessary for addressing this issue and
generates a stronger e±ciency result: the wage-posting framework ensures not only the e±cient
division of the match surplus between the two sides of the match, as in Moen (1997), but also
the e±cient allocation of machine qualities to di®erent skills.
The frictional assignment model is also closely related to two-sided matching models analyzed
recently by Burdett and Coles (1997), Shimer and Smith (1998), Sattinger (1995), and Burdett
and Wright (1998). In particular, Shimer and Smith have also reached the conclusion that suf-
¯cient complementarity in production between the two sides of the market is necessary for a
2Another strand of the search literature, surveyed by McMillan and Rothschild (1994), assumes that agents only
know the distribution of wages before search and must incur the search cost to ¯nd any particular wage. With this
type of search the market assignment is also unlikely to be e±cient.
4frictional assignment to be positive.3 Focusing on equilibrium outcomes rather than e±ciency,
these models follow the footsteps of earlier random-matching models to employ exogenous match-
ing functions and/or exogenous rules of surplus division between matched agents. In contrast,
the current model uses the wage-posting setup to endogenize both the matching function and
the surplus division which, as described above, are essential for the market mechanism to deliver
e±ciency. In comparison with Shimer and Smith (1998), in particular, the additional di®erence
is that the number of ¯rms here is determined by free-entry rather than being ¯xed. Allowing
for endogenous entry is necessary for the market to provide the correct tightness for each skill.
Also, if matching is time-consuming and the ratio of agents on the two sides of the market is
¯xed at an arbitrary number, a non-positive assignment may not be surprising. By allowing for
free-entry, I establish a stronger result: Even when the market tightness adjusts e±ciently, the
assignment is not necessarily positive.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the frictionless assign-
ment. Section 3 characterizes the e±cient assignment with matching frictions. Section 4 describes
the decentralization mechanism. Section 5 examines the properties of the frictional assignment.
Section 6 extends the analysis to a dynamic setting and calibrates the model. In particular, the
wage distribution and its responses to technological progress are calculated. Section 7 concludes
the paper and the appendix provides some proofs.
2 Frictionless assignment
For the moment let us consider a simple economy where the time horizon is one period and
agents are all risk neutral. There are a large number, N, of workers who di®er in skills. To make
things simple, skills can be observed and measured by a one-dimensional object s, which lies in a
compact set S with a minimum sL > 0 and a maximum sH. Skills are distributed among workers
in the labor force according to G0(¢) with a density function g0(¢). The number of workers with
skill s is n(s) = Ng0(s), which is a large exogenous number.
3There is also a fair amount of work that analyzes centralized matching with frictions and/or decentral-
ized matching without prices (see Roth and Sotomayor (1990)). In contrast, the focus of this paper is on how
prices/wages can induce e±ciency in a decentralized matching framework.
5Machines di®er in qualities that are denoted k 2 K µ R+. A machine of quality k costs
C(k) to make. In contrast to the ¯xed distribution of workers, the distribution of machines is
endogenously determined by ¯rms' entry. A machine can be operated by only one worker at a
time. Workers and ¯rms derive income solely from their production. A worker of skill s operating
a machine of quality k produces output F(k;s). Machine qualities and skills are complementary,
i.e., Fks > 0. The assignment problem is to ¯nd a mapping Á: S ! K, that assigns a machine
quality Á(s) to each skill s. The assignment is called positive if higher skills are assigned better
machines, i.e., if Ás(s) > 0.
Assumption 1 (i) C(0) ¸ 0, Ck(0) = 0, Ck(k) > 0 and Ckk(k) ¸ 0 for all k > 0;
(ii) Fk(k;s) > 0, Fkk(k;s) < 0, Fs(k;s) > 0 and Fss(k;s) < 0 for all s and k;
(iii) Fks > 0, F(0;s) = F(k;0) = 0;
(iv) There exists a non-empty subset of K such that F(k;sL) ¡C(k) > 0;
(v) (FkCkk ¡CkFkk)F > (Fk ¡Ck)F2
k.
Conditions (i) and (ii) are standard for cost and production functions. (iii) requires skills and
machine qualities to be complementary and, for unmatched machines and workers, output to be
zero. (iv) says that even the lowest skill can produce positive net output with some machine
qualities. Since Fs > 0, there are positive match surpluses to be made for all skills. (v) is a
concavity condition necessary for the assignment problem to have a maximum.
Consider ¯rst a perfect world without matching frictions so that every worker can be matched
instantaneously with a machine. The e±cient assignment in this world, denoted Áp, maximizes
the net output, F(k;s) ¡C(k). That is, for each s, Áp(s) satis¯es:
Fk(Áp(s);s) = Ck(Áp(s)): (1)
Under Assumption 1, the assignment Áp exists and is unique. Moreover, complementarity between
skill and machine quality implies Áp
s(s) > 0, i.e., the assignment is positive.
The e±cient assignment canbe decentralized as follows. Imagine that for every pair of machine
quality and skill, (k;s), including those pairs that are not observed in equilibrium, there is a wage
6W(k;s). This wage schedule must satisfy two requirements: it must be non-negative for every
pair (k;s), and whenever F ¡ C ¸ 0 it must deliver zero net pro¯t for the ¯rm. The zero net
pro¯t requirement comes from the assumption that there is free entry by ¯rms into the economy.
Thus, for every pair (k;s),
W(k;s) =
(
F(k;s)¡ C(k);if F(k;s) ¡ C(k) ¸ 0
0; otherwise.
(2)




Thus, the choice of k maximizes the net output and the solution is the e±cient assignment given
in (1). This assignment implies the following equilibrium wage for skill s:
wp(s) ´ W(Áp(s);s) = F(Áp(s);s) ¡ C(Áp(s)) > 0:
The equilibrium wage satis¯es wp
s(s) = Fs(Áp(s);s) > 0. Thus, as in a standard framework
with homogeneous machines, a skill is rewarded at the margin with its marginal product and
higher skills get higher wages. In contrast to a framework with homogeneous machines, the wage
(or earning) function is not necessarily concave: Since the assignment is positive, a higher skill
uses a better machine and so the marginal product of skill may increase with skill levels.
The competitive assignment problem canbe formulatedas a dual problem where ¯rms compete
in o®ering machines to workers so as to minimize the net cost W + C ¡ F. That is, given the
wage schedule and for any given skill s, the choice of k solves:
max
k
fF(k;s) ¡ C(k) ¡W(k;s): W(k;s) ¸ wp(s)g.
The dual formulation illustrates that ¯rms cannot increase the net pro¯t by bringing into market
s a machine that is di®erent from Áp(s).
It is important that the wage schedule W(k;s) speci¯es a wage for every possible pair (k;s),
even though in equilibrium only the pair (Áp(s);s) is observed for each skill s. For all k0 6= Áp(s),
7(2) is a restriction o® the equilibrium path and it is rationalized as follows.4 Other pairs (k0;s),
where k0 6= Áp(s), are not observed in equilibrium not because no ¯rm has ever thought about
pairing k0 with s but because k0 is inferior to the chosen one Áp(s). If a ¯rm o®ers k0 6= Áp(s) to
workers with skill s and makes a non-negative pro¯t, the ¯rm should expect other ¯rms to enter
and drive the wage to W(k0;s) = F(k0;s) ¡ C(k0). In this case, the ¯rm will not attract any
worker, since W(k0;s) < W(Áp(s);s) for all k0 6= Áp(s).
The same o®-the-equilibrium-path restriction implies that workers of skill s have no incentive
to apply to ¯rms with any other machine quality k0 6= Áp(s). If they did, they would receive the
wage W(k0;s) which is strictly less than the wage they receive if they stay with ¯rms with Áp(s).
3 E±cient assignment with frictions
Now consider an economy with frictions that not all workers and machines can be matched
instantaneously. The simplest way to do this is to assume that a worker can apply to at most
one ¯rm in the period. Let the e±cient assignment be Áo(¢) and, for brevity, refer to the group
of machines with quality Áo(s) and workers with skill s as market s, although at this point I
am not concerned with the market assignment. If there are m(Áo(s)) machines in market s (and
n(s) workers), the matching probability is 1 ¡ e¡bo(s) for each ¯rm and [1 ¡ e¡bo(s)]=bo(s) for
each worker, where bo(s) ´ n(s)=m(Áo(s)) is the tightness of market s. These probabilities are
derived later in Section 4. At this point let us notice that the matching probabilities depend on
the tightness in an intuitive way and they imply a linearly homogeneous matching technology.
The e±cient assignment in this frictional world maximizes the sum of expected net product
of all pairs of machine qualities and skills. The social planner cannot achieve this objective by
choosing machine qualities alone. This is because the sum of expected net output also depends
on the number of matches. The planner must also choose the number of ¯rms for each market s,












4Similar restrictions o® the equilibrium path are imposed in Gale (1992).
8subject to mo(s) = n(s)=bo(s). The ¯rst term in the square brackets of the integrand is expected
output of each ¯rm and the second term is the cost of the machine. Note that a machine must
be put in place in order to be matched with a worker and so the cost of the machine must be
incurred regardless of the outcome of the match.









(4) states that the assignment Áo equates the expected marginal product of the machine quality,
(1¡e¡b)Fk, to the marginal cost. To explain (5), note that adding one more ¯rm to the market
increases the expected net output by (1 ¡ e¡b)F ¡ C but also increases congestion to existing
¯rms. The increased congestion reduces each existing ¯rm's matching probability by b
me¡b and
hence reduces aggregate output in that market by be¡bF. (5) requires that the number of ¯rms
be such that at the margin expected net output from an additional ¯rm is equal to expected
crowding out caused by that ¯rm.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, there exist an e±cient assignment Áo and an associated
market tightness bo. Moreover, Áo(s) < Áp(s) for every s 2 S.
Proof. Under (v) in Assumption 1, the solution to (4) and (5) is a local maximum of the
e±cient assignment problem if it exists. Since the LHS of (4) is less than one for all b < 1, the
assignment must satisfy Ck < Fk. Since the frictionless assignment Áp(s) satis¯es Ck = Fk and
since Ck ¡Fk is an increasing function of k, the condition Ck < Fk is equivalent to Áo(s) < Áp(s)
for all s. Also, the LHS of (4) is greater than that of (5) for all b > 0 and so the assignment must
satisfy Ck=Fk > C=F. This is equivalent to k > kmin(s), where kmin(s) is de¯ned as follows:
[F(k;s)Ck(k) ¡C(k)Fk(k;s)]k=kmin(s) = 0: (6)
Under Assumption 1, kmin(s) is well de¯ned and 0 · kmin(s) < Áp(s).



















Temporarily denote the left-hand side of the above equation by LHS(k) for any given s. Then
LHS(kmin(s)) < 0, LHS(Áp(s)) > 0 and so, for each s 2 S, there is at least one solution for k
lying in the interior of (kmin(s);Áp(s)). QED
For general functional forms uniqueness of the e±cient assignment is di±cult to be estab-
lished but will be assumed throughout the following analysis. Examples in Section 5.2 show that
uniqueness is guaranteed for some popular functional forms. Note that the frictional assignment
assigns a lower machine quality to each skill than the frictionless assignment does. This is because
the possibility of failing to get matched in the frictional economy reduces the expected pro¯t from
any machine quality. Let me delay the discussion on other properties of the e±cient assignment
and turn now to the decentralization of the e±cient assignment.
4 Market assignment with frictions
To decentralize the e±cient assignment described above, consider the following markets. For each
pair (k;s), there is a market tightness schedule B(k;s) determined by a zero-pro¯t condition for
entry. Taking this schedule as given, each ¯rm selects a machine quality and each worker chooses
a quality k to target the application. Before each worker selects any particular ¯rm in the targeted
group, ¯rms post wages simultaneously. Observing all the posted wages, workers decide which
¯rm to apply to, possibly with mixed strategies, and then each ¯rm chooses a worker among its
applicants. Note that, in contrast to the frictionless world, what is taken as given by ¯rms here
is not the wage schedule but the schedule of market tightness.
The problem can be solved backward. First, for given machine quality k and the tightness
B(k;s), I determine the equilibrium wage in market s, W(k;s). With the wage I can compute
¯rms' expected pro¯t and workers' expected wage. Second, the market tightness schedule B(k;s)
must be such that ¯rms in each market earn a zero expected net pro¯t, i.e., the expected pro¯t
10equals the cost of the machine. Third, taking the schedule B(k;s) as given, ¯rms solve for the
assignment by choosing k to maximize workers' expected wage.
4.1 Wage W(k;s)
Isolating the market where the machine quality is k and workers' skill is s, I determine the wage
emerging from the wage posting game. Variables here are indexed by (k;s) which are suppressed.
It is useful to express the wage as a share A of output, i.e., A = W=F, and formulate ¯rms' wage
posting decision as one that determines the wage share. Throughout this paper, I am interested
only in the equilibrium that is symmetric within each market, i.e., in equilibrium all ¯rms in a
market post the same wage share A for the same skill.
All ¯rms announce their wage shares simultaneously and workers apply to the ¯rms after
observing all posted wage shares. If a ¯rm gets only one worker, the worker is rewarded the job.
If the ¯rm gets more than one worker, each worker is selected with equal probability. In either
case, production begins immediately after the match and output is divided between the worker
and the ¯rm according to the posted share. If a ¯rm fails to recruit any worker, output is zero.5
Since workers observe all posted wages and then choose which ¯rm to apply, ¯rms can directly
in°uence workers' application strategies through the posted wages. To be more speci¯c, let all
(m ¡ 1) ¯rms in the market post a wage share A and the remaining one ¯rm post a wage share
Ad. Call this ¯rm the deviator and other ¯rms non-deviators. If Ad > A, the deviator can
attract more workers than non-deviators do. However, not all workers go to the deviator with
probability one { if they did so, the probability for each to be selected by the ¯rm would be very
small (1=n) and workers could improve the expected wage by applying to a non-deviator. Let pd
be the probability with which each worker applies to the deviator. Then p = (1¡pd)=(m ¡1) is
the probability with which the worker applies to each of the non-deviators.
5The qualitative results will be similar if each worker observes only two independently drawn wages, but the
exercise is more cumbersome (see Acemoglu and Shimer (1998)). Similarly, one can allow ¯rms to post the reserve
wage rather than the actual wage and then hold an auction after receiving two or more applications. With this
setup the actual wage equals the reserve wage if the ¯rm receives only one application and equals zero if the ¯rm
receives at least two applications. The reserve wage serves a role very much like the actual wage in the current
framework but there is a dispersion in actual wages (see Julien et al. (1998)). Such a dispersion complicates the
analysis without contributing much to the main issue.
11To ¯nd how pd depends on Ad, let us compute the expected wage of an arbitrary worker in that
market, say worker 1, who applies to the deviator. When worker 1 applies to the deviator, there
might be k other workers applying to the same ¯rm, which occurs with probability Ck
n¡1(pd)k(1¡
pd)n¡1¡k. In this case worker 1 is chosen by the ¯rm with probability 1=(k +1). Since k can be









If worker 1 gets the job from the deviator, his ex post gain (wage) is AdF. The expected gain
must be the same as that obtained from applying to a non-deviator, i.e.,





This equation implicitly de¯nes a function pd = pd(Ad), which can be shown to be an increasing
function. Therefore, by posting a higher wage share the deviator can obtain a higher expected
number of workers. Since the function pd(¢) is continuous, workers respond to a marginal increase
in the o®er by only a marginal increase in the application probability.
The deviator chooses Ad to maximize the expected pro¯t, taking the dependence pd(Ad)
into account but taking other ¯rms' wage shares as given. Since the probability with which the
deviator has at least one worker is 1 ¡(1 ¡pd)n, Ad solves:
max
Ad f[1¡ (1¡ pd)n](1 ¡ Ad)F: (8)g.
The above problem can be solved directly but the algebra is messy. The complexity arises
from the fact that a single ¯rm's deviation a®ects both pd and p. That is, the expected wage
that a worker gets from applying to any other ¯rm, the right-hand side of (8), is also a®ected by
Ad. By posting a high wage share the deviator attracts workers away from other ¯rms, reduces
the congestion that workers face in other ¯rms and hence increases workers' expected wage from
applying to those ¯rms. To simplify algebra, I assume that n and m are su±ciently large. In
this case, a single ¯rm's deviation has a negligible e®ect on the congestion which workers face in
12other ¯rms and so the deviator can treat the expected wage that a worker gets from other ¯rms
as exogenous (see Burdett et al. (1996)).6 Denote this expected market wage as a share EA of
output. Then, for large n and m, the solution to the deviator's problem can be approximated




[1¡ (1¡ pd)n](1 ¡ Ad):
1 ¡ (1 ¡ pd)n
npd Ad = EA
)
:
The above deviation cannot be pro¯table in equilibrium and so the solution to the above
problem must be Ad = A, which implies pd = p = 1=m. In the limit n;m ! 1 (but n=m ! B),





It is evident that A is in the interior of (0;1) for all ¯nite B and is a decreasing function of B.
Thus, workers get a smaller share of the output when the ratio of workers to ¯rms is larger.
Moreover, the matching probability for a ¯rm is endogenously determined as 1 ¡ (1 ¡ p)n !
1 ¡e¡B and the matching probability for a worker is






These matching probabilities were used in Section 3 for the e±cient assignment. Each worker's
expected wage, EW, and each ¯rm's expect pro¯t, EP, are as follows:
EW = e¡BF; EP = [1¡ (1+ B)e¡B]F: (10)
These results are intuitive. If a ¯rm did not face any risk of failing to obtain a worker, i.e., if
e¡B = 0, the ¯rm would have all the monopoly power and would demand the entire output; if
a worker did not face any risk of failing to get a job, the worker would have all the monopoly
power and would demand the entire output. More generally, as the market gets tighter, i.e.,
6More precisely, when n and m are both large with a ¯nite ratio n=m, the e®ect of a single ¯rm's deviation
on the probability that each worker applies to the deviator, p
d, is of order 1=n, but the e®ect on the probability
that each worker applies to a non-deviator, p = (1 ¡ p
d)=(m ¡ 1), is of order 1=n
2. Thus, the deviation has a




negligible e®ect on the probability that a worker obtains a job from a competing ¯rm, [1¡ (1¡ p)
n]=(np).
13as B increases, the worker's expected wage as a share of output decreases and the ¯rm's share
increases. Note that EW and EP do not add up to the value of output: the remainder, Be¡BF,
is the expected loss in output due to congestion and is borne by the ¯rm.
4.2 Market tightness and the choice of machine quality
The market tightness schedule B(k;s) must be such that the expected net pro¯t of operating
machine k with skill s is zero, i.e., EP(k;s) = C(k), where EP is given above. This is true for
such (k;s) that output is at least as high as the cost of the machine. For all other (k;s) such
that C(k) > F(k;s), no ¯rm will adopt k for s and so B(k;s) = 1. That is,
(
1 ¡ [1 +B(k;s)]e¡B(k;s) =
C(k)
F(k;s);if C(k) · F(k;s)
B(k;s) = 1; otherwise.
(11)
Taking the schedule B(k;s) as given, each ¯rm chooses k to maximize workers' expected wage,
i.e., maxk e¡B(k;s)F(k;s). The solution yields the assignment k = Á(s), which induces a market
tightness for market s, b(s) = B(Á(s);s). Since the choice of k a®ects the value of B, to depict
the solution in a two-dimensional diagram we can alternatively formulate the problem as such









The solution is illustrated in Figure 1. For any given s and the worker's expected wage, the
worker's indi®erence curve, B = IND(k), is increasing and concave. The constraint in (P) gives
an upward sloping curve, B = ZNP(k). The place where the two curves are tangent to each other
gives the solution to the ¯rst-order conditions of (P). Condition (v) in Assumption 1 ensures
ZNPkk > INDkk around the solution and so the solution is a local maximum of (P).
I now argue that the assignment leaves no incentive for ¯rms or workers to deviate. As in
the frictionless assignment, the assignment problem (P) can be alternatively written as a dual
problem where each ¯rm maximizes the expected net pro¯t, subject to the constraint that the
worker gets at least the equilibrium expected wage. Therefore, if a ¯rm brings into market s a
di®erent machine quality Á0 6= Á(s), it will make a negative net pro¯t.
14B
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Figure 1:
15Note that (11) imposes o®-equilibrium-path restrictions on the tightness which can be ratio-
nalized as follows. If a ¯rm o®ers k0 6= Á(s) to worker s and makes a non-negative pro¯t, the ¯rm
should expect other ¯rms to enter to o®er k0 to s as well, which will drive the expected net pro¯t
to zero and the market tightness to B(k0;s) described in (11). Similarly, for a worker s who tries
to target a machine quality k0, both the ¯rms and the worker must perceive a tightness B(k0;s).
This o®-the-equilibrium restriction makes it irrational for worker s to target any machine quality
other than Á(s): Given the tightness schedule, Á(s) maximizes the expected wage of worker s.
I am now ready to present the central result:
Proposition 2 The assignment given by the solution to (P) is an equilibrium (market) assign-
ment. The market assignment Á and the market tightness b are e±cient.
Proof. I have already argued that the solution to (P) forms an equilibrium. To show that it
is e±cient, let ¸ be the Lagrangian multiplier of the constraint in (P). The ¯rst-order condition




This combined with the constraint in (P) gives 1¡e¡B = Ck=Fk, which is the same as (4). The
constraint in (P) is the same as (5). Therefore, the solutions for (k;B) are (Áo;bo). QED
Remark 1 Since the market assignment is e±cient, the expected wage for a worker with skill s





where L is the maximized value of the social welfare de¯ned in (3). Then w(s) can be recovered
from the relation Ew(s) = w(s)(1 ¡e¡b(s))=b(s).
The market assignment is e±cient because equilibrium wages are tied endogenously to the
market tightness in a special way. As (9) reveals, the wage share for a pair (k;s) is a decreasing
function of the market tightness, B(k;s). For any given skill, if there are fewer ¯rms in the
market, i.e., if B(k;s) is larger, the wage posting scheme enables ¯rms to explore the relatively
16large supply of labor and retain a larger share of output. Thus, for given s, a higher quality
and more expensive machine is rewarded with a larger share of the surplus. This higher share
does two things for a more expensive machine. First, it compensates the diminishing marginal
product of machine quality and enables the (expected) social marginal product of machine quality,
(1 ¡ e¡B)Fk, to be equal to the social marginal cost, Ck. Second, it ensures that the number of
¯rms using the machine to be equal to the e±cient one, i.e., the one given by (5).
Another way to look at the connection between the wage share of output and the market
tightness is to tie the wage share to the matching function. The matching function is endogenously
generated by the wage-posting game and the total number of matches in a period in market s
is m(1 ¡ e¡n=m). The elasticity of the total number of matches with respect to the number of










Therefore, the wage-posting outcome rewards each factor by precisely the factor's contribution
to the match, de¯ned as the elasticity of matches to the factor. This is not a sheer coincidence.
Rather, it arises from the fact that agents (¯rms) who actively create matches by creating vacan-
cies are given the \property rights" to choose the split of the match surplus (by choosing wages).
Also, they are the ones who bear the congestion from their choices, as (10) shows.
It should then be clear that e±ciency cannot be guaranteed by arbitrary wage determination
schemes. One such scheme that fails is the Nash bargaining framework in Diamond (1982),
Mortensen (1982), and Pissarides (1990). In these models, both the matching function and the
weights in Nash bargaining are exogenously ¯xed. When the wage is determined, there is only
one ¯rm and one worker on each side of the bargain and each side has local monopoly power.
This one-to-one situation does not accurately re°ect the composition of ¯rms and workers before
the match and so the Nash bargaining outcome typically fails to deliver e±ciency. The only
exception is when the worker's bargaining weight is exogenously set to be equal to that in (9),
but then it cannot be constant as it necessarily varies with the market tightness. This e±ciency
17requirement is, of course, the one obtained by Hosios (1990). The current analysis generalizes it
to a richer environment. Not only is the condition necessary for the match surplus to be divided
e±ciently between workers and ¯rms, but also it is necessary for stimulating ¯rms to choose the
\right" machine quality for each skill.
The second scheme that fails to deliver e±ciency is the search models surveyed by McMillan
and Rothschild (1994), where workers know only the distribution of wages and must costly search
to ¯nd a speci¯c ¯rm's wage o®er. Since any speci¯c ¯rm's wage is not observed by workers
before search, it does not in°uence workers' search decisions directly; only the distribution of
wages does. That is, individual ¯rms' wages do not have the ex ante allocative role as they do in
the wage-posting framework and so the market tightness for each skill is unlikely to be e±cient.
5 Properties of the frictional assignment and wages
5.1 Properties
An important feature of the frictional assignment is that each skill level is associated with a
market tightness as well as a machine quality. One implication is that the assignment is not
always positive. If high-skill workers get matched su±ciently more quickly than low-skill workers,
they may get lower quality machines than do low-skill workers and yet still enjoy a higher expected
wage. That is, the machine assignment can be negative if b(s) is su±ciently decreasing in skill.
These properties are stated below:7














Thus, bs ¸ 0 implies Ás > 0 and so Ás · 0 implies bs < 0. Under (v) in Assumption 1, there is
a non-empty parameter region in which both Ás > 0 and bs < 0.
7The proof is omitted, since it involves tedious algebra of di®erentiating (4) and (5) and substitution.
18Although a positive assignment cannot be guaranteed in general, it does emerge when skills
and machine qualities are su±ciently complementary to each other in production. Exactly how
complementary should the two factors be to generate a positive assignment depends also on
features of the cost function. On the other hand, if the two are extremely complementary to each
other, an increase in skill requires a large increase in machine quality, which at the margin is very
costly for ¯rms to make. In this case there will be fewer ¯rms using high qualities machines, i.e.,
bs(s) > 0. When skills and machines qualities are strongly but not extremely complementary to
each other, high skills are assigned high quality machines and ¯nd jobs more easily.
These properties can be illustrated in Figure 1 by increasing the skill level from s to s0. When
s increases to s0, the zero-net-pro¯t curve ZNP(k) shifts down. The new tangency point in Figure
1 can be either on the left or on the right side of the original tangency point and so Á(s0) can
be either smaller or greater than Á(s). Similarly, the new tangency point can be either above or
below the original tangency point and so a higher skill is not necessarily associated with a less
tight market or a higher matching probability. Nevertheless, if the new solution is at least as
high as the original one along the vertical axis, then it must be on the right side of the original
one. That is, for s0 > s, b(s0) ¸ b(s) implies Á(s0) > Á(s) and so Á(s0) · Á(s) implies b(s0) < b(s).
With a negative assignment, higher skills must be compensated by a higher matching rate.
I now turn to equilibrium wages. First, let us examine the expected wage for worker s:
Ew(s) = e¡b(s)F(Á(s);s) = e¡B(Á(s);s)F(Á(s);s):
The fact that the worker's indi®erence curve IND(k) in Figure 1 moves toward southeast when
s increases shows that a higher skill gets a higher expected wage, regardless of the signs of Ás
and bs. A close inspection of the expression for the expected wage reveals that skill might a®ect
the expected wage in three ways. An increase in s (i) a®ects the machine quality assigned to it;
(ii) increases output directly; and (iii) attracts more ¯rms to the market and hence reduces the
workers' congestion. The e®ect of (i) on the expected wage depends on whether the assignment
is positive, but the e®ects of (ii) and (iii) are unambiguously positive. Moreover, the e®ect of (i)
19on the expected wage vanishes when the machine quality is chosen optimally by the ¯rm. In the
current setting, in particular, the output increased by a better machine is exactly canceled by the
increased congestion that the better machine creates for workers (since, for any given skill, the
higher cost of the better machine make fewer ¯rms choose it).
The observed wage for skill s is w(s) ´ W(Á(s);s). Direct computation yields:
Proposition 4 Ews(s) > 0 for all s. If Ás ¸ 0 then ws > 0. That is, a higher skill is rewarded
a higher wage if the assignment is positive. Moreover, ws < Fs(Á(s);s) if and only if bs(s) < 0.
The result that wages increase with skills for positive assignments is not obvious ex ante. As
stated in Proposition 3, a positive assignment may be accompanied by an increasing matching
rate for high skills. Since what matters to workers' decisions is not the actual wage but rather the
expected wage, the outcome ws < 0 can be consistent with Ás > 0, a priori, if b(s) is su±ciently
decreasing. The proposition shows that this does not happen in equilibrium.
The proposition also states that the marginal reward to skill, ws, is less than the marginal
product of skill if and only if the matching rate increases with skill. This is because an increase in
skill is compensated not by the actual marginal product but by the expected marginal product of
skill which takes into account of the matching rate. If a higher skill comes with a lower matching
rate, i.e., if bs > 0, the additional skill must be compensated by more than the marginal product
of skill in order to make up for the reduced matching probability. This is in contrast with the
result in the frictionless economy, where ws is always equal to the marginal product of skill.
The case where b(s) is constant over S is an important special case. What economies give rise
to a constant b? The following proposition provides an answer (see Appendix A for a proof) and
the next subsection provides some examples.
Proposition 5 Suppose b(s) = constant. Then the assignment Áo is positive. If F(k;s) is
linearly homogeneous in (k;s), then there exist constants (±1;±2) with ±1 < ±2 < 1 such that Á(s)
20is implicitly given by the following equation:











where f(k=s) ´ Fs=Fk. If the production function F is the CES type, F = F0[®k½+(1¡®)s½]1=½,











and the cost function must have the following form:












In this case the assignment is concave if and only if Ckk > 0.
5.2 Examples
Example 6 C(k) = C0k° and F(k;s) = F0k®s1¡®, ® 2 (0;1).
This is a special case described in Proposition 5, with ½ = 0. In fact, taking the limit ½ ! 0
on (16) shows that C(k) = C0k®±2=±1 for some C0 > 0. Therefore, ®±2=±1 = ° and the unique







The assignment is concave if and only if ° > 1, an implication of Proposition 5. Since bs = 0,
Proposition 4 implies that the marginal wage ws is equal to the marginal product of labor.
Example 7 C(k) = C0k and F is the CES form with ½ < 1.
This is another special case of Proposition 5, with Ckk = 0. Setting Ckk = 0 in (16) yields
a restriction on Á(sL). Substituting such Á(sL) into (15) yields Á(s) = Á0s for some constant
Á0 > 0. The assignment is positive and linear. This example is interesting because Jovanovic
(1998) shows that, in a frictionless assignment, non-degenerate distributions of skills and machine
qualities are consistent with positive long-run growth in per-capita income only when the cost of
machine is linear in quality, at least at the aggregate level. This example indicates that a similar
result can be established when the assignment is frictional.
21Example 8 F(k;s) is the CES type with ½ 6= 0 and C(k) = C0k° with ° > 1.
The assignment is no longer linear and bs 6= constant. The assignment can even be decreasing
in skill. To see this, let C0 = 0:2, ° = 3, F0 = 1, ® = 0:35 and ½ = 0:8. Then Á(2) = 0:254 >
0:25 = Á(3). Skills are compensated for the negative assignment by a higher matching rate, as
b(2) = 0:075 > 0:064 = b(3).
6 Dynamic assignment
I now extend the analysis to a dynamic setting where unmatched workers and ¯rms keep trying
to get matched over time. The extension is necessary for three reasons. First, it is important
to show that the central results are robust to workers' and ¯rms' dynamic concerns. Second,
the one-period model is di±cult to be calibrated to check the quantitative results. Third, it
is important to examine how steady state wage distribution responds to disturbances in the
production technology. I characterize the e±cient allocation below.
6.1 Characterization and existence
Firms and workers live forever and discount future with a factor ¯ 2 (0;1). Quality k machine
costs C(k)=(1 ¡ ¯) to produce and so C(k) is the cost per period. Now N is the total number
of workers in the entire labor force rather than the ones who are looking for jobs. Let n(s) be
the exogenous number of skill s workers in the labor force and g0(s) ´ n(s)=N be the density of
the skill distribution in the labor force. A number ut(s) of skill s workers are unemployed at the
beginning of period t and Et(s) are employed after recruiting in period t. Since ut(s) and Et(s)
are measured at di®erent points of time in period t, they do not add up to n(s). Let mt(s) now
stands for the number of ¯rms that recruit in period t in market s rather than the total number of
¯rms in market s. In any period t, the labor market tightness in market s is bt(s) = ut(s)=mt(s);
the matching rate is ¹t(s) ´ (1 ¡ e¡bt(s))=bt(s) for each unemployed worker and 1 ¡ e¡bt(s) for
each recruiting ¯rm. Those ¯rms that already have a worker at the beginning of a period do not
recruit in that period and, similarly, those workers who already have a job at the beginning of the
period do not look for a job. Also as before, the machine cost per period is incurred the moment
22a ¯rm posts a vacancy.
If an unemployed worker and a vacant job get matched in period t, they produce immediately.8
After production, some matches separate. Since the focus here is on recruiting rather than
separation, I simply assume that each match separates with an exogenous probability ¾. Thus,
the number of workers remaining matched at the beginning of period t is (1 ¡ ¾)Et¡1(s). Then,
ut(s) = n(s) ¡ (1 ¡¾)Et¡1(s); (17)
Et(s) = (1 ¡ ¾)Et¡1(s) +¹t(s)ut(s): (18)
Eliminating ut(s) gives employment dynamics:
Et(s) = ¹t(s)n(s) + (1 ¡¾)[1 ¡ ¹t(s)]Et¡1(s): (19)




; u(s) = n(s) ¡(1 ¡¾)E(s): (20)
The social planner now maximizes the sum of net present value added in each period. Consider
the cost of machines ¯rst. Each time a vacancy is posted, the cost for that period is that of the
vacant machine, which is C(k) for machine k. The number of vacancies in period t is ut(s)=bt(s).
Using (17), aggregate vacancy cost in period t in market s is
C ¢
n(s)¡ (1 ¡ ¾)Et¡1(s)
bt(s)
:
Next, consider the value produced by new matches in t. The number of new jobs created in period





1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ¾)
:
The ¯rst term on the left-hand side is the present value of the net product from the new match,
where the discount rate takes into account of both subjective discounting and job separation.
8Often it is assumed that new matches start to produce in the next period. The immediate production assumed
here has no particular implications on the analytical results. It is used here because it is used in the one-period
setting. This makes it easy to interpret the one-period result as a special case of the dynamic result when ¯ ! 0.
23Since the machine cost in period t is counted both in the vacancy cost and in the net product in
period t, it is added back onto the present value of the new match to avoid double accounting.
The e±cient assignment assigns a machine quality kt = Át(s) and a market tightness bt(s) for



























1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ¾)(1¡ e¡b(s))
: (23)
The above conditions have similar interpretations to the one-period counterparts, (4) and (5),
and approach the one-period counterparts when either ¯ ! 0 or ¾ ! 1.
Remark 2 Focusing on the steady state assignment does not lose much insight. In fact, the
¯rst-order conditions for (kt;bt;Et) can be used to obtain a closed sub-system of dynamic equa-
tions involving only k and b. Thus, when a shock hits the system, the values of kt and bt must
immediately jump to the new steady state levels, while Et gradually adjusts.
Rewriting (22) and (23) to express Ck=Fk and C=F as functions of b, as in (4) and (5), one
can use the same procedure for proving Proposition 1 to show that the steady state assignment
exists. Therefore, the features of a one-period assignment can be easily translated into the
dynamic environment for the steady state assignment. Also, the dynamic e±cient allocation can
be decentralized by a market assignment following a similar route to that in Section 3. The
exercise is much more involved because agents now consider the payo®s from in¯nitely many
periods. There is no need to repeat the procedure here.9
Equilibrium wages can be computed directly from (21) using Remark 1 in Section 4. That
is, since the equilibrium allocation is e±cient, wages must be such that the expected gain to an
9A proof is contained in http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/pub/faculty/shi/fassign1.PDF
24unemployed worker with skill s is equal to the social marginal bene¯t of increasing n(s). Let us
focus on the steady state and compute the expected gain to the worker. Let Vu(s) be the steady
state value function of an unemployed worker with skill s and Ve(s) be the corresponding value
function when the worker is employed. Then,
Vu(s) = ¹(s)Ve(s) +[1 ¡¹(s)]¯Vu(s);
Ve(s) = w(s) + ¾¯Vu(s) +(1 ¡¾)¯Ve(s):
If an unemployed worker gets hired, the value is Ve, but if he/she fails to ¯nd a job, the value is
the discounted value from the next period, ¯Vu. The expected gain to the worker is ¹(s)[Ve(s)¡







where LD is de¯ned in (21). From the value functions one can obtain:
¹(s)[Ve(s) ¡¯Vu(s)] = (1 ¡¯)Vu(s)
= w(s) ¢
h





Computing dLD=dn(s) and using (23), we have:
w(s) =
C(Á(s))
eb(s) ¡ 1 ¡b(s)
·





Given market tightness b(s), the wage w(s) is an increasing function of the machine quality
assigned to it; given the machine quality Á(s), the wage w(s) is a decreasing function of the
market tightness. Of course, the assigned machine quality and the market tightness cannot be
separated because they are a package of the deal.
6.2 Steady state distributions
Let us denote the steady state density of the skill distribution in employment by h(¢) and the
skill distribution in unemployment at the beginning of a period by g(¢). The density of the wage
distribution is then h(w¡1(¢)), where w¡1(¢) is the inverse function of the wage function w(¢).







25The number of workers unemployed at the beginning of a period is N ¡(1 ¡¾)TE. Then,
h(s) =
n(s)=TE





Naturally, both distributions depend on the skill distribution in the labor force through n(s).
More important, the skill distributions in employment and unemployment depend on equi-
librium tightness in each market, b(s). Compared with the exogenous distribution of skills in
the labor force, g0(s), the skill distribution in employment is more skewed toward high skills and
the skill distribution in unemployment is more skewed toward low skills if and only if bs(s) < 0.
Since the market tightness depends on the assignment Á(s), one must have a good idea about the
nature of the assignment in order to make inferences on the skill distribution in each status of
employment. In contrast, in a frictionless economy every worker ¯nds a match instantaneously
and so the skill distribution in employment is identical to the one in the labor force.
Compared with a frictionless world, in a frictional world it is also more unreliable to directly
draw inferences on the shape of the skill distribution from the wage distribution or vice versa. In
the frictionless world, the assignment is always positive and so observing the wage distribution
tells us something useful about the skill distribution in the labor force. For example, if the
density of the wage distribution is uniform, then the skill distribution in the labor force must
also be uniform; if the density of the wage distribution has a peak at some level w¤, then the
skill distribution density in the labor force must also have a peak at some skill level s¤. Such
inference cannot be made in a frictional world without knowing the assignment. For example,
unevenly distributed wages over skills can be consistent with uniform distribution of skills in the
labor force if fewer high-skill workers are unemployed than low-skill workers.
The market assignment and the market tightness both depend on the production function
and the cost function of producing machines. To say more about the wage distribution and the
skill distribution in employment, I calibrate the model next. The exercise also shows whether the
di®erential tightness is quantitatively signi¯cant for wage inequality.
266.3 Numerical exercise
In the following numerical exercise, skill levels are discrete points ranging from sL = 1 to sH = 5,
with a mean sM = (sH +sL)=2 and a grid 0:08. The total number of skill levels is 51. Skills in the
entire labor force are assumed to be uniformly distributed over the 51 levels, i.e., g0(s) = 1=51.
The uniform distribution is used here because the distributions of wages and employment in the
frictional economy can be easily compared with those in a frictionless economy. The production
function and the cost function are:
F(k;s) = F0k®s1¡®; C(k) = C0(k° +C1):
The constant C1 > 0 captures the cost of machines that are independent of the quality.
The parameter values are as follows:
N = 1, F0 = 1, ® = 0:3, ¯ = 0:99, ¾ = 0:06,
° = 2:8565, C0 = 27:0596, C1 = 0:01519.
The total number of workers, N, and the multiplier in the production function, F0, are normalized
to one. ® is set to 0:3, which gives a wage share of output as 66% for s = sH.10 The length of
a period is interpreted as a quarter and so the discount factor, ¯, is chosen to imply a quarterly
real interest rate around 1%. The quarterly job separation rate ¾ = 6% is a realistic number, as
documentedin Davis and Haltiwanger (1991). To identify °, I set the unemployment rate to 12:5%
for workers with skill sL and to 6:5% for workers with skill sM, where the unemployment rate is
the average of the rate before recruiting, u(s)=n(s), and the rate after recruiting, 1¡E(s)=n(s).
These rates are realistic. For example, the U.S. unemployment rate in 1991 is 12:3% for workers
who had less than 4 years of high school and 6:7% for workers who had 4 years of high school
only (Bureau of the Census, 1997). With (22) and (23), these two restrictions solve for °. They
also give a restriction between C0 and C1. Finally, I set C1 = 0:1 £ kM to solve for C0 and C1,
where kM is the machine quality allocated to workers with skill sM.11
10The wage share of output is commonly calibrated to 0:64 (see Christiano, 1998). When labor were paid with
the marginal product, this would imply ® = 0:36. A lower value of ® is chosen here because wages are strictly
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Figure 2: Machine quality assignment
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Figure 3: Wages and matching rates
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Figure 4: Distributions of machine qualities
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Figure 5: Wage distributions
31The main characteristics of the frictional assignment are illustrated in Figures 2 ¡ 5 with
circles, together with the characteristics of the frictionless assignment (solid lines). I discuss
them below. First, the assignment is positive and concave, as shown in Figure 2. This result is
useful because a positive assignment cannot be guaranteed a priori, as stated in Proposition 3.
Second, Figure 2 con¯rms the result in Proposition 1 that the machine quality assigned to each
skill is lower in the frictional economy than in the frictionless economy. The di®erence between
the two gets larger as skill increases. Figure 3 reveals similar di®erences in wages between the
two economies. It is remarkable that even with signi¯cant unemployment the machine quality
and wage for each given skill in the frictional economy are very close to those in the friction-
less economy. Do we then conclude that the frictions do not matter much for machine quality
assignments or wages? Of course not, and we come to the third feature.
Third, the distributions of machine qualities and wages are more skewed toward high levels in
the frictional economy than in the frictionless economy. Figure 4 plots the employment density for
each skill in the two economies, h(s) and g0(s), against the corresponding machine quality, Á(s)
and Áp(s). The diagram gives the densities of machine qualities in the two economies. The ¯gure
shows that about 6% fewer machines with the lowest quality and about 2:5% more machines with
the highest quality are used in the frictional economy than in the frictionless economy. Similarly,
Figure 5 shows a similar skewness of the wage density in the frictional economy. Thus, there is a
sense that the wage distribution is more unequal in the frictional economy.
The additional inequality arises here not because a higher skill is assigned with an even higher
machine quality than that suggested by the traditional assignment literature. On the contrary,
the opposite occurred, as discussed above for Figure 2. Rather, the additional inequality arises
because the assignment induces changes in the employment distribution. That is, it reduces the
proportion of low-skill workers in employment by making the market tighter for them. This
below the marginal product of labor.
11Not surprisingly, machine qualities and wages vary sensitively with the value chosen for C1=kM. However, this
amounts to a shift in the supports of the wage and machine quality distributions but not much change in the shape
of these distributions.
32additional channel for the assignment to a®ect wage inequality can be seen from Figure 3, where
the matching rate ¹(s) increases with skill. The wage share (not shown) also increases with skill,
as ¯rms compete for high-skill workers.
6.4 Responses to a reduction in machine costs
I now brie°y examine the response of the assignment to a technological progress that makes
machines cheaper to make. In particular, consider the case where the costs for all machines fall
in the same proportion. I examine this type of technological progress not because I believe it is
the most realistic one but because its e®ects on skill and wage distributions are not clear relative
to the e®ects of, say, a skill-biased technological progress. Let C0 fall by 5%. The percentage
changes in machine assignment, wages and matching rates are reported in Figures 6 and 7 for
both the frictional economy (circles) and the frictionless economy (lines).
Not surprisingly, the reduction in machine costs increases the machine quality assigned to each
skill. This is true for both economies, but the percentage increase in machine qualities is slightly
smaller in the frictional economy than in the frictionless economy. The increases in quality are
almost uniform across skills in both economies. In contrast, the percentage wage increases are
far from uniform, as shown in Figure 7. The cost reduction bene¯ts low-wage earners much more
than high-wage earners. In both the frictional economy and the frictionless economy, wages at
the bottom increases by more than 15% but wages at the top increases by less than 3%. Thus, a
uniform reduction in machine costs reduces wage inequality in both economies.
The reduction in wage inequality is larger in the frictional economy than in the frictionless
economy, because there is a simultaneous shift in employment distribution in the frictional econ-
omy. Although the matching rate increases for all skills when machine costs fall, it increases by
roughly 10% for bottom-wage earners but by less than 2% for top-wage earners. The employment
distribution becomes less skewed toward high skills than before.
A general interpretation of the result is that a uniform technological progress bene¯ts low-skill
workers more than high-skill workers by increasing the relative employment of low-skill workers.
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Figure 6: Responses in machine qualities
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Figure 7: Responses in wages and matching rates
35However, technological progress is not always uniform and in many cases it reduces the cost of
advanced machines proportionally more than reducing low quality machines (see Greenwood and
Yorukoglu (1997)). In this case, employment and wage distributions will become more rather
than less skewed toward high-skill workers (see Shi (1998) for a comparison).
7 Conclusion
A wage-posting framework is shown to induce an e±cient assignment between diverse skills and
diverse machines when the matching is time-consuming. The (e±cient) frictional assignment
assigns each skill with a market tightness as well as a machine quality. It has several features
in contrast with a frictionless assignment. First, higher skills are not necessarily assigned higher
machine qualities even when machine qualities and skills are complementary in production {
su±cient complementarity is required for a positive assignment. This is because a higher skill
can be su±ciently compensated by a less tight market without a higher machine quality. Second,
di®erences in skill prices re°ect di®erences not only in skills and machine qualities assigned to
them but also in matching rates. If skills and machine qualities are su±ciently but not extremely
complementary with each other, higher skills are assigned better machines and experience higher
matching rates. In this case the wage distribution is more skewed toward high wages in the
frictional economy than in the frictionless economy. Calibration exercises show that the matching
friction increases inequality more through the di®erential tightness than through wages.
As indicated in the introduction, the use of the framework is not restricted to the labor
market. Rather, it is applicable to any market that has the following features: a large number of
participants on each side of the market who have diverse characteristics, a matching process that
is time-consuming, and a high turnover rate. For example, the loan market can be analyzed in
a similar way, where projects can di®er vastly in size and probability of success and loans come
also in di®erent sizes and terms.
Even if we restrict the discussion to the labor market, the analysis should be useful for macroe-
conomists who like to know how technological progress a®ects productivity and the allocation
36of skills. It should also be useful for labor economists who estimate the earning function. The
central implication of the analysis is that a worker's wage depends on market characteristics,
such as the market tightness, in addition to the worker's characteristics, such as skill, and the
¯rm's characteristics, such as machine quality and capital intensity. An earning function that is
estimated without much attention to market characteristics is likely to be biased, as reality is
that skilled workers are more likely to ¯nd a job than unskilled workers. The estimates are also
likely to be unstable when there is rapid technological progress, which changes the di®erential
market tightness for di®erent skills and the wage distribution.
The analysis is only a ¯rst step to analyzing frictional assignments and some important aspects
of the labor market are ignored, such as multi-dimensional skills, match-speci¯c productivity,
private information and/or uncertainty in productivity. These elements will enrich the model by
increasing wage inequality between similar workers and hence allow a better match between the
model and the data. They will also illustrate the ex post role of wages in retaining workers and
revealing productivity, in addition to the ex ante role of attracting workers analyzed here.
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39Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 5
When b is a constant, Proposition 3 immediately implies Ás(s) > 0. Also, (4) and (5) imply that
Ck=Fk = ±2 and C=F = ±1 are constants, with ±1 < ±2 < 1. Totally di®erentiating the equation




















Integrating from sL to s yields the solution in the proposition.
If F is the CES type, then f(y) = 1¡®
® y1¡½ and integrating (25) gives (15). Substituting
s = Á¡1(k) into the function F and using C = ±1F, one recovers the cost function (16). With







which is also necessary and su±cient for Áss(s) < 0. QED
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